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INTEGRATION OF LEASED AND UNLEASED INTERESTS

The scope of this paper, notwithstanding its title, is lim ited to the area
of what is now commonly referred to as "compulsory” or "forced" pooling or
integration.

In view of the fact that the legal problems which are involved in

that subject include, in one way or the other, a substantial portion of the field
of oil and gas law, this paper is further lim ited to a consideration of the present
Arkansas statutes on compulsory pooling, with som e discussion and speculation
as to the reason for the amendment of the form er statutes on that subject.

For

other articles and d iscussion s of compulsory pooling in general and of particular
asp ects thereof, reference is made to the table of authorities.
Before entering into the discussion of the subject, I believe it will be
worth while to consider, from an historical viewpoint, certain rules of law and
principles which evolved over the years in the field of oil and gas, and which
contributed to the advent of compulsory pooling.

1.

During the period that the law of oil and gas was in its formative state,
it is now apparent that the courts were ignorant of the nature of oil and gas.
Of course, the courts were not alone in their ignorance.

One authority

2

in

discussing the evolution of the law or rule of capture, states:
"The judges knew no more about the true nature of oil
and gas reservoirs than did the oil operators and geologists of
the tim e, so the judges were hard put to decide what was right
or wrong in the ca se of this strange m ineral............. No precedent
being known, they looked for analogies and found them in percolating waters and in game. "
In one of the leading c a se s announcing what has becom e known as the "law
of capture" or the "rule of capture", decided in 1907 by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, an example of the admission by the courts of their lack of knowledge o f the
true nature of oil and gas w ells and reserv o irs is found.

There the Court states:

"An oil or gas well may draw its product from an indefinite
distance and in time exhaust a large space. Exact knowledge on
this subject is not at present attainable, but the vagrant character
of the mineral and the porous sand rock in which it is found and
through which it moves fully justify the general conclusion we have
stated above and have led to its general adoption by practical operators. The right of every landowner to drill a w ell on his own land
at whatever spot he may see fit certainly must be conceded. If,
then, the landowner d rills on his land at such spot as best subserves his purpose, what is the standing of the adjoining landowner
whose oil or gas may be drained by the well ? He certainly ought
not to be allowed to stop his neighbor from developing his own farm.
There is no certain way of ascertaining how much of the oil and gas
that com es out of the well was when in situs under this farm and how
much under that. What, then, has been held to be the law? It is th is,
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as we understand it, every landowner or his le sse e may locate his w ells
wherever he p lea ses, regardless of the interests of oth ers. He may d istribute them over the whole farm or locate them only on one part of it.
He may crowd the adjoining farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and
gas from them. What, then, can the neighbors do? Nothing; only go and
do likew ise. He must protect his own oil and gas. He knows it is wild
and w ill run away if it finds an opening and it is his business to keep it
at home. This may not be the b est rule; but neither the Legislature nor
our highest Court has given us any better. No doubt many thousands of
dollars have been expended 'in protecting lin es’ in oil and gas territory
that would not have been expended if som e rule had existed by which it
could have been avoided. " 3
The rule of capture has been more distinctly defined by the Supreme Court
of Texas as follows:
That rule sim ply is that the owner of a tract of land acquires title
to the oil or gas which he produces from w ells on his land, though part
of the oil or gas may have migrated from adjoining lands. He may thus
appropriate the oil and gas that have flowed from adjacent lands without
the consent of the owner of those lands, and without incurring liability to
him for drainage. " 4
Under the rule of capture, as exem plified by the above ca ses, in the absence
of any kind of regulation or of any agreement among all the producers and royalty owners
in a pool, it is obvious that, once a pool was discovered, a competitive race to drill
wells and produce the oil and gas was a practical necessity, for the owner who delayed
in drilling, or who failed to get as much production from his w ells as his neighbors
produced from their w ells, would lose oil by drainage to the adjacent properties.
Each w ell was drilled and exhausted as rapidly as was physically possible in the
effort by each producer to get his oil and gas to the surface and reduced to p o ssessio n .
Under th ese circum stances waste was inevitable.
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As sufficient technological understanding of the behavior of oil and gas
pools was developed, it becam e apparent that one of the fundamental causes of
waste was unrestricted production, but it w as equally as apparent that because
of the m ultiplicity of ownership in m ost oil and gas fields and the resultant conflicts
of interest, efforts of individual producers alone could not effectively prevent w aste.
Thus it was from necessity that a system of law evolved under which oil and gas
could be produced in a relatively efficient manner and under which a better method
than unrestricted drilling and production would be devised to protect property rights.
It was during this sam e period of tim e that the conservation movement in the
United States was gaining momentum.

One of the conservation devices which evolved

is the restriction on the drilling of w ells, since it is partly through the location of w ells
that fluid movements within a reservoir are controlled, and since the cost of drilling
and equipping the w ells is usually the m ost substantial part of the total cost of developing
a pool, the number of w ells drilled directly affects the econom ics of the operation. 5
One of the ways that a restriction of drilling can be accomplished is through the outright
lim itation of the right to drill, which takes the form of the specification of the minimum
acreage on which a well w ill be permitted, such as one oil w ell on each 40-acre tract,
or one gas w ell on each 640-acre tract. However, difficulty is presented when the
minimum acreage for which only one well is permitted co n sists of a number of
separately owned tracts.

If the owner of a tract is not permitted to have a w ell on

his tract and thereby a means of participating in the total production from a pool, the
oil and gas under his tract w ill be drained.

Therefore, it is n ecessary that he be given

an opportunity to recover his share of the oil and gas within the pool. If his tract is
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sm aller than the established minimum size for a w ell, and he is denied the right
to d rill, he is directly deprived of his property. It is at this point that the topic
of integration of leased and unleased in terests becom es pertinent.
In the case of Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, 6 decided in 1900 by the Supreme
Court of the United States, it was established that the states in the exercise of their
police powers could place restrictions upon the rule of capture. While that c a se of
course had nothing to do with compulsory pooling, it did set the stage for further
leg islative encroachments upon the rule of capture.
Even though the advocates of conservation were becoming more vocal and
w ere gaining the attention7 of high authorities of the United States in the early 1920's,
the fir s t restrictive drilling and compulsory pooling enactments were not motivated by
the prevention of waste but resulted from the nuisance and safety factors caused by
drilling in incorporated c itie s.

In 1927 the City of Oxford, Kansas enacted an ordinance

which prohibited the drilling of more than one well to each city block and provided that
if the person obtaining the drilling permit for a block did not hold lea ses on all of the
lots in such block, the perm it would be conditioned so that the drilling party would deliver to each owner whose lot was not so leased a proportionate share of l/8 th of the
oil, such proportion being on a square foot b a sis.

Provision was also made for is su -

ance of the permit to the party having under lea se the largest area in the block and for
participation as a working interest owner of le s s e e s and owners of unleased lots who
owned the sm aller area in the block by the posting of appropriate guarantees for their
share of c o sts.

This ordinance was the subject of the first case before the courts
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which concerned compulsory pooling and was considered first in the Federal D istrict
Court of Kansas ® in 1928 and then by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th
Circuit 9 in 1929.

The latter Court, in affirming the validity of the ordinance, states:

"But looking to the substance of things, as equity does, what
are the rights of plaintiffs that w ill be encroached upon or denied to
them by the enforcement of this ordinance ? It is not the m ere right
to drill a well on one or two lots at great cost and stop with that, or
to take the proportionate part of the oil and gas in the pool that might
be said to lie under or be fairly attributed to those lo ts. The obvious
purpose was to reach the pool as quickly as possible and take all of the
oil and gas obtainable before others could get it, thus seriously encroaching upon and probably destroying the same rights of adjoining lot owners.
If one or m ore lot owners have given a lea se for which no permit is
obtainable their le sse e may join a le ss e e who has a perm it in the sam e
block on term s that are fair to both le sso r and le s s e e . If a lot owner
has not given a le a se he is protected by the asking in a fair proportion
of the mineral produced by a perm ittee. The regulations make every
effort to protect, rather than to destroy rights. They extend equal
opportunity to all who have an in terest and eliminate the race between
those having equal rights in a common source of wealth, so that some
may not take all and leave others with nothing. "
Subsequently the validity of sim ila r ordinances of other cities was sustained
by the courts. 10
The States were not far behind in adopting statutes providing for the creation
of drilling or spacing units and the compulsory pooling of in terests therein in the
absence of agreement. 11 At the present tim e there are som e 29 states that have
som e form of compulsory pooling. 12 The m ost notable exception of states that have
substantial production with no provision for compulsory pooling are Kansas and Texas.

6.

To digress for a moment from compulsory pooling, for a vivid illustration
of the inequities resulting from statutes and regulations thereunder which fix spacing
units permitting only one well to be drilled thereon but at the sam e tim e do not provide
for compulsory pooling of separately owned interests within the spacing unit, it is not
n ecessary to look any farther than our neighboring state of Texas. An illustration of
this is the recent case of Hitchcock v. Sojourner Drilling Corporation, 13 decided in
1962 by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.

In that case the plaintiff executed an oil

and gas le a se on 156 acres, including 24 a cres which he subsequently conveyed to one
of the defendants. After the conveyance, oil was discovered and produced from the 24acre tra ct so conveyed, under a 40-acre spacing rule fixed by the Railroad Commission.
Plaintiff, as the owner of the other 16 acres in the spacing unit and there being no
possib ility of a well being allowed thereon, contended that he was entitled to 16/40ths
of the royalty from the w ell on the spacing unit, notwithstanding that it was not located
on his land, and that the spacing arrangement constituted a forced pooling of p la in tiff's
16 a cres with the 24 a cres.

The Court, in denying the claim o f plaintiff, reaffirm ed

the traditional and long-standing rule o f property that royalties belong to the owner of
the particular tract upon which the w ell is located and that the regulations of the Railroad
Commission in fixing spacing units cannot effect a change o f property rights.
Of course the compulsory pooling statutes met with fierce resistance sin ce the
methods used and results derived under the statutes differed m aterially from the
relatively unfettered rule of capture.

Following the enactment of the Oklahoma law

in 1935 its validity was fir st challenged in Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas C o ..1 4
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and the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered its decision thereon on March 1, 1938
sustaining the constitutionality of the law.
statute

Except for one ca se involving a California

which prohibited drilling more than one well to an acre, but which did not

provide for the participation by the owners o f lands upon which no well could be drilled
under the statutory lim itations, the courts have upheld the validity of compulsory
pooling laws 16 in every case in which they have been in issu e.
The validity of Arkansas laws on compulsory pooling has not been at issu e in
any reported court decision, although prior to the recent amendment the statute had
been utilized numerous tim es in hearings before the Oil and Gas Commission. As a
matter of fact, it appears that the Court has made reference to the statute in only a few
ca ses, one of these ca ses being Poindexter v . Lion Oil Refining C o .,

decided by

the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1943, a case involving lease cancellation for failure
to offset and develop, and the defendant apparently contended that it was precluded
from drilling on one of the tracts involved because its lease only covered one-half
of the m inerals.

The Court made short work in disposing of that objection, stating:

''This presents no serious difficulty. Our laws provide means whereby
the entire mineral interest can be leased for the benefit of all concerned.
See.........§ 15 of Act 105 of 1939. No effort has been made to invoke the
benefit of such,law s, "
Again, in Yelvington v . Alston, T rustee, 19 decided in 1944, the Court's dicta
invited a party to utilize the compulsory pooling laws.

This w as a rather peculiar

case which has been cited by som e authorities 20 as a rejection by Arkansas of the
theory of equitable pooling which has been approved by the Courts of M ississippi and
Louisiana.

However, it is my opinion that the case did not go that far and the
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question has not yet been determ ined in A rkan sas.

In that c a se a well was

drilled pursuant to a d rillin g p e rm it and the num ber of a c re s covered thereby
was indicated as twenty.

Yelvington owned one-half of the m in e rals in seven

acres in the 20-acre tr a c t but he did not own under the d rill site .

The evidence

showed that the d rilling p erm it was issued on the b asis of 1 0 -ac re spacing and
Yelvington' s m ineral in te re s t was not in the 10 a c re s in which the well was located.
Thus th ere was no d iv erse ownership of se p a ra te tra c ts within the drilling unit
and the p rere q u isite for pooling, either com pulsory, voluntary o r equitable, was
not p rese n t.

The C ourt pointed out that when the other 1 0 -a c re drilling unit was

drilled it might req u ire an integration o rd e r because of the d iv erse ownership, but
the question was not then before the C ourt.
Let us now tu rn to a discussion of the statutes concerning com pulsory
pooling, with p a rtic u la r re fe re n c e to the old A rkansas statute, since p rio r to its
revision it was the p a tte rn for a substantial num ber of statu tes in other sta te s.
By Act 105 of 1939 the A rkansas L egislature enacted a com prehensive
conservation statute.
Statutes of 1947.

It is now codified a s Section 53-101 et seq. of the A rkansas

The declaration of policy for the Act s ta te s:

"In recognition of past, p re s e n t and im m inent evils occurring
in the production and use of oil and gas, as a re s u lt of waste in the
production and use thereof in the absence of co-equal o r c o rrelativ e
rig h ts of ow ners of crude oil or n a tu ra l gas in a comm on source of
supply to produce and use the sam e, this law is enacted for the protection of public and private in te re s ts against such evils by prohibiting
waste and com pelling ratab le production. " 22

9.

A broad definition of w aste is provided 23 including the inefficient, ex cessiv e
or improper use or dissipation of reservoir energy; the locating, spacing or producing
of w ells in a manner which results, or tends to result, in reducing the quantity of oil
or gas ultimately to be recovered; and abuse of correlative rights due to drainage
because of nonuniform, disportionate and unratable withdrawals. Waste is prohibited. 24
The Oil and Gas Commission is vested with general authority to regulate the spacing
of w ells and to establish drilling units, 25 and in addition the statute specifically provides
that the Commission shall provide drilling units for each pool, and each drilling unit so
established shall com prise the maximum area which may be efficiently and econom ically
drained by one w ell. 26 The term "owner" is defined as the person who has the right to
drill into and to produce from any pool, and to appropriate the production either for
him self or for him self and another, or others. 27
integration of drilling units.

Section 5 3 -115A provided for the

That section, before the 1963 amendment, provided to

the effect that when two or more separately owned tracts of land are embraced within
an established drilling unit and the owners thereof do not agree to integrate their
in terests, the Commission shall require them to do so and the operator designated
by the Commission was given the right to charge the other owners for their share
of co sts, and the operator was given the right to receive the production of any nonpaying owner to secure the payment of such co sts.
Over the years sin ce the enactment of that Act, many questions concerning its
construction and operation have been raised.

While none of th ese questions w ere

presented to the Arkansas Supreme Court, som e questions under alm ost identical
statutes in other states w ere answered by the Courts of those sta tes.

One of the
10

first of these questions which occurs to a reader of the statute, is just what is a
separately owned tract of land ? In Smith v. Holt, 28

decided by the Louisiana

Supreme Court in 1953, the defendant Holt owned a 40-acre tract in fee. In
October 1939 he sold the east half to plaintiff’s predecessor in title and the w est
half to another party, reserving all m inerals in both of the conveyances. Thereafter, Holt executed an oil and gas lea se covering the entire 4 0-acre tract, and
subsequently the Louisiana Conservation Department established the 40-acre tract
as a drilling unit and a producing w ell was completed at a location on the w est half
of the drilling unit.

Plaintiff brought suit to establish that prescription had

extinguished the m ineral servitude on the east half of the drilling unit since no
drilling has occurred thereon.

One of the contentions of plaintiff was that the order

creating the spacing unit was not intended to operate as a pooling order but m erely
laid the foundation for, and must be implemented by, a second order effecting a
voluntary or forced pooling of each particular unit. The Court held that, under the
definition of "owner”, that is the person who has the right to drill into and produce
and to appropriate the production either for h im self or for others, defendant Holt’s
le sse e alone could qualify as owner, and sin ce there was only one owner of the
drilling unit, to require the le ss e e to go through the procedure of obtaining a forced
pooling order would be a vain and u seless act, neither favored in law nor contemplated
by the statute.
Let us now take a slightly different s e t of facts. Suppose that a 40-acre
drilling unit has been established and A is the mineral owner o f the east half of
that forty and B is the m ineral owner under the w est half, and by Separate le a se s
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which do not contain pooling clauses, both A and B grant le a se s to C. Under the
authority of Smith v. Holt, forced pooling is not perm issib le sin ce there is only
one owner under the statutory definition.

But what are the rights of A or B if

the only w ell which is perm itted to be drilled is drilled on the w est half of the
drilling unit which is subject to a lease from B? Under the rule of capture B would
be entitled to receive all royalties from the unit well and A would get nothing.

In

addition, no drilling could be done on the tract of A since only one well may be drilled
on each drilling unit.

Louisiana and M ississippi 29 have applied what is now commonly

r e f e r r e d to as "equitable pooling" to this situtation, in holding that the effect of the
drilling under those circum stances was the unitizing of the drilling unit to the end
that a ll royalty owners therein share the royalty from the oil and gas produced from
the w ell thereon, with the decisions being based on equity and not on the provisions
of the compulsory pooling statutes.

M yers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, indicates

however, that the weight of authority is to the contrary.
While still considering the question of what is a separately owned tract of
land, let us change our assumption and assum e that in our hypothetical 40-acre drilling
unit, M r. A is the mineral owner of an undivided one-half in terest in the entire forty
which he leases to C, and Mr. B is the m ineral owner of the remaining undivided onehalf in terest which he le a se s to D.

Under those circum stances, are there separately

owned tracts of land to which the compulsory pooling statute may be applied? That
question was presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Denver Producing and
Refining Co. v. Meeker,

decided in 1947 and the Court answered in the negative,

holding that the le ss e e s were tenants in common and not the separate owners of two
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or m ore separate tracts embraced within a spacing or drilling unit.

The Oklahoma

sta tu te s have been amended to provide for the compulsory pooling of undivided
in te re s ts . 32
Other questions occur but have not been presented for a judicial determination.
For instance, if a drilling unit has not been created when the w ell is drilled, could
the C om m ission thereafter require that other "Owners" who did not participate in
such d rillin g and who are compelled to pool their interests, pay a portion of the
d rillin g co sts ? This question would be pertinent each tim e that a wildcat w ell is
d rille d , since the authority of the Oil and Gas Commission is to establish units
c o n sistin g of the maximum area that can be efficiently and econom ically drained by
one w e ll, 33 and of course that cannot be determined until the well is drilled.

I raise

this question because the statute provided that in the event integration was required,
the operator designated by the Commission to develop and operate the unit shall have
the rig h t to charge each other interested owner the actual expenditures required for
such purposes.

Of course, in the question presented, the development had already

o c c u rre d and the Commission would appear to be lim ited to designating the operator
for production purposes, and the right of the operator to make expenditures to be
borne by the forced pooled owners would be expenditures for operation.
The statute also provided that the designated operator shall have the right to
re c eiv e the first production which otherwise would be delivered or paid to "the other
p a rtie s jointly interested in the drilling of the w e ll," so that the amount due by each
of them for his share of the expenses o f drilling, equipping and operation of the well
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may be paid to the operator out of production.

I would assum e that the reference

to "the other parties jointly interested in the drilling of the well" actually meant
"forced pooled owners" and of course they may or may not have been "jointly interested in the drilling of the w ell. " I believe i f the compulsory pooling order was
issued prior to the drilling of the w ell, the "forced pooled owners" would be "jointly
interested" parties, but if the well was already drilled before the issuance of the
compulsory pooling order, it is rather difficult to see just what the "joint interest"
was.

In that connection, you w ill recall that the statute provided that operator shall

have the right to receive the fir st production which otherwise would be delivered to the
"forced pooled owners" (here again I assum e that means the sam e as "the other parties
jointly interested in the drilling of the well"), to the end that the operator would be
reim bursed out of production.

At that stage we have the operator receiving all production

attributable to the interest of the "forced pooled owner", but at the sam e tim e the "forced
pooled owner" does have certain obligations to his lesso r, one of the primary obligations
being to pay royalty, and it follows that if the operator is to receive all production which
otherwise would be paid to the "forced pooled owner" (and a portion thereof in turn paid
by him to his lessor), then the forced pooled owner must satisfy his contractual royalty
obligations out of pocket.
You w ill also recall that under the statute the owner desiring to take the initiative
and drill a well upon the drilling unit was required to assum e the entire risk if any other
owner therein, no matter how affluent he might be, decided for any reason whatsoever
not to participate in the drilling. Of course if the w ell was dry or did not repay out of
production the entire costs of drilling, then the drilling party sustained the lo s s, and
14.

if the well was successful the drilling party was only entitled to be reimbursed out of
production for the portion of the costs which would have otherwise been borne by the
other owner, with no increm ent for assuming the risk or for use of his money.
In an attempt to answer and anticipate som e of the questions posed above, the
Arkansas Legislature in 1963 enacted Act No. 563.
statute on compulsory integration of drilling units.

This Act amended the prior
As so amended the statute now

provides (1) that separately owned tracts or separately owned interests in all or part
of an established drilling unit may be integrated; (2) that if, at the tim e of the effective
date of the integration order, a well has not been completed as a commercial producer,
all owners in the drilling unit shall have an opportunity t o participate in the drilling
thereof but that upon the failure by any such owner to participate therein he shall transfer
his rights in the drilling unit to the participating parties for a reasonable consideration
and on a reasonable b a sis, which the Commission shall determine in the absence of
agreement.

Such transfer of right may be either a permanent transfer or may be for a

lim ited period pending recoupment by the participating parties of an amount equal; to that
which would have been borne by the non-participating party, plus an additional sum to be
fixed by the Commission; (3) if at the tim e of the integration order a well has already
been completed, then the non-participating party may either reim burse the drilling party
in cash or the drilling party may receive all of the production of the non-participating
party until the drilling party has been reim bursed an amount equal to the share of costs
which would have been borne by the non-participating party, plus an additional sum to be
fixed by the Commission; (4) unleased m ineral interests shall be considered a royalty to
the extent of l/8 th of such unleased interest; (5) royalty, overriding royalty, production
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payments or sim ilar in terests in the drilling unit are integrated without the n ecessity
of an order of compulsory integration; (6) provision is made for allocation of production
to tracts and the distribution of the portion so allocated to the parties entitled to royalty,
overriding royalty, e t c . , therein; and (7) all operations upon a well on any portion of
the drilling unit shall be deemed for all purposes as if conducted upon each separately
owned tract and interest in the drilling unit.
In the relatively short time since the enactment of that legislation, no question
thereunder has been presented to the Arkansas Supreme Court. However, this Act,
in the resu lts sought to be achieved, is sim ilar to the Oklahoma statute and the
Oklahoma courts have had various questions before it which concern that statute.

Of

particular interest are the decisions pertaining to the sharing of co sts by owners in the
drilling unit and the participation in production therefrom.

In three c a se s, all involving

the sam e w ell and p arties, and all styled Wood Oil Company et al v. Corporation Comm ission et al,

35

those questions were considered. Wood Oil Company in early 1947

completed and started producing oil from a w ell it drilled in accordance with appropriate
well spacing requirem ents.

This w ell, pursuant to a Commission Order (No. 19,890),

was subsequently incorporated into a 40-acre spacing unit in which Toklan Production
Company owned a portion of the leasehold interest, so that Toklan was entitled to
participate in production from the w ell. On July 1, 1947, Toklan filed its application
with the Commission requesting an adjudication of the respective rights of all owners
in the unit and pursuant thereto, by order of December 2, 1947, the Commission
issued its order (No. 20,690) requiring that Toklan pay its proportionate part of the
costs and participate in production from date of first production.

The first c a se , decided
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July 18, 1950, upheld the spacing unit.

The second case, decided on the sam e day

as the first case, modified the order of the Commission insofar as it had granted
Toklan the right to participate in production prior to the date that the order creating
the spacing unit issued.

Thus the case estab lish es the effective date of participation

in production as the date that the order creating the spacing or drilling unit is su e s and
not the date of the order force pooling the unit.

The third c a se , decided December 22,

1953, m erely affirmed certain findings of the Commission regarding participation in
production and costs, and in so doing established (1) that an owner who is forced pooled
is required to share only in actual expenditures and then only to the extent that the same
are reasonable; (2) no in terest can be charged to the forced pooled owner unless interest
is a part of the actual expenditure and was paid; and (3) all such actual expenditures are
to be borne by all on an acreage basis.
Another aspect of th ese cases was that the forced pooled owner was required
to pay a proportionate part of the original w ell cost, although he was not entitled to
participate in production therefrom for several months after its completion.
In Anderson v . Corporation Commission and Kenneth A. Ellison, 36 decided by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1957, the constitutionality o f that portion of the Oklahoma
statute permitting the Commission to require that a forced pooled owner either participate
in drilling or transfer h is rights was sustained. In that case the plaintiff owned approximately 40% in fee in a 4 0 -a cre tract. Defendant Ellison owned a leasehold in terest in
the adjoining 40 acres, and the Commission had designated the two 40-acre tra cts as a
single drilling unit.

On application of defendant Ellison the Commission entered an

17

order finding that all other owners except plaintiff in the drilling unit had agreed
upon a plan of development of the unit and authorized defendant Ellison to d rill a
well.

The order also provided that plaintiff have the option either to participate

in the drilling of the w ell by paying his share of the costs, or of leasing his in terest
to defendant Ellison for $800 per acre, which the Commission found to be a reasonable
bonus.

Plaintiff contended that a co ten a n cy relationship existed between h im self and

Ellison by reason of the pooling and unitization order, and the order requiring him to
participate in paying the costs or to lease to Ellison was in violation of the rights of
co- tenants, and that the statute was unconstitutional in that it amounted to a taking of
private property for private use and without due process of law.
The Court, in upholding the order and the validity of the statute, stated that
consideration of the correlative rights of owners became a n ecessary part of statutes
curtailing drilling, and the statute complained of was a n ecessary and integral part of
securing those various rights.

The Court further held that the order complained of

did not deprive plaintiff of his property, as he was granted the right to participate in
oil produced from another's w ell.
In Wakefield v . State of Oklahoma et al, 37 decided in 1957 by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, the plaintiffs also asserted the co-tenancy theory but carried it a
step forward to the end that as in all co-tenancies, the right of partition existed and
that the partition proceeding should culminate in a forced sa le.

The Court stated that

to follow that reasoning another step, instead of a "develop or sell" situation as provided
by the statutes, there would be a "buy or sell" situation, and o f course that was not
within the scope of the statute.
18.

Another case of interest arising out of Oklahoma is Youngblood v. Seewald, 38
decided by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in 1961.

The facts of this

case are that the Oklahoma Corporation Com m ission established 640-acre drilling
units for gas for the reservoir in question.

Defendant owned or otherwise had arrange-

ments for control of all but approximately 64 acres in one of th ese units.

Plaintiff

owned a lea se on the 64-acre tract, which lea se provided for a 3/16 royalty and was
also burdened by a 1/8 of 7/8th s overriding royalty reserved by plaintiff's assignor.
Defendant and plaintiff couldn't reach an agreem ent to drill a w ell and defendant made
application for an order pooling the le sse e interest.

The Corporation Commission

issued its order authorizing defendant to d rill and operate the unit,well, fixing the cost
of drilling and completing the w ell and giving the owners of outstanding leasehold
interests (plaintiff) one of three options, the first being to participate in the w ell by
paying a proportionate part of the cost, the second being to transfer his interest for
$50 per acre bonus, and the third being to receive an overriding royalty of 1/8 of
8/8th s.

Plaintiff elected to take an overriding royalty of 1/8 of 8/8ths. Defendant

contended that he acquired plaintiff's leasehold interests burdened only with the usual
l/8 th le s s o r 's royalty and the overriding royalty of l/8 th of 8/8th s provided for in
the order.

(Of course that would leave plaintiff holding an empty sack, since in effect

there would be an "oversale" if defendant's position were sustained). In question was
52 Okla. St. Ann § 8 7 .1(d) which, among other tilings, provides as follow s:
"Where a lease covering any such spearately owned tract or interest
included within a spacing unit stipulates a royalty in e x ce ss of 1/8 of
the production, o r ......... shall be subject to an overriding r o y a lty ...........
then the le sse e of said lease out of h is share of the working interest
from the well drilled on said unit, shall sustain and pay said excess
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royalty, overriding royalty, or production payment, and therefrom
m eet any other obligation due in respect to the separately owned tract
or interest held by h im ."
Defendant contended that the effect of that statute is that when one designated to drill
the w ell on a drilling unit acquires the working interest on other lea ses within the unit
by virtue of the pooling order, the owner of ex cess or overriding royalty in th o se lea ses
m ust look to the person who owned the lea ses just prior to the pooling order for payment
of their royalties.
The Court, in overruling defendant’s contention, was undoubtedly, influenced
by plaintiff’s predicament in that he would have been excluded from participating in
the production as a working interest owner, and still the share he had elected to receive
would be insufficient to satisfy the remaining overriding burdens.

Under those conditions

the Court had no difficulty in determining that the statute does not specify whether the
" le sse e of the le a se ” should be determined before or after the pooling order and that
the Com m ission did not undertake to disturb the ex cess royalty or the prior overriding
royalty and those burdens, in addition to the 1/8 of the 8/8ths pooling order overriding
royalty m ust be satisfied by defendant, who is now the ’’le s s e e ” referred to in the statute.
While I have no quarrel with the Court’s conclusion, it would seem that room
for chicanery and manipulation now exists under this and sim ilar statutes.

For instance,

the owner of an unleased mineral interest in lands comprising a spacing unit which in all
probability w ill be drilled, can execute a 1/4 or 1/2 royalty le a se to his son or brother,
e tc ., or the owner of a lea se under the above circum stances could assign to a friendly
third party and reserve a substantial override - the result would either be a free ride
for all tim e or non-development.

20.

Even though the Arkansas Supreme Court was not called upon to decide upon
the constitutionality of our old law on compulsory pooling or any matters arising
thereunder in the twenty-three years of its existence, and even though the new law
was designed to answer many of the questions and eliminate many of the apparent
shortcom ings of the old law, it would appear that the subject o f compulsory integration
rem ains a fertile field for litigation, and I would suspect that in the not too distant
future we w ill be privileged in hearing some leading authority discuss the latest
c a se s under the Arkansas compulsory unitization law.

21.

